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FOR-PROFITS UNDER FIRE:
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AS A
REGULATORY CHECK ON THE
FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION SECTOR
Gayland 0. Hethcoat II *
INTRODUCTION
T heir presence is pervasive throughout the United States: Onposters at bus stops, in television commercials, and in pop-up ads
on the Web, for-profit institutions of higher education strive to sell
themselves to a public that has long equated education with success.
Ranging from cosmetology schools to schools that grant degrees in
business administration and criminal justice, for-profits often exploit
as selling points the factors that distinguish them from traditional
public and private nonprofit colleges and universities. Evening,
weekend, and online courses are increasingly a staple of for-profits'
curricula. The courses themselves function not to provoke intellectual
debate for its own sake as much as to equip students with skills
directly transferable to the workplace. In a word, for-profits offer
flexibility-the key for many Americans to educating themselves and
rising above the dregs of a downturned economy.
Undoubtedly, for-profits-which totaled about 2,900
*J.D., University of Miami; B.S., Virginia Commonwealth University. The
author thanks Jennifer H. Arlen, the Norma Z. Paige Professor of Law at New York
University School of Law.
' This article generally uses "institution" to refer to all institutions of higher
education and "for-profit" to refer to proprietary, or profit-seeking, institutions of
higher education. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-
PROFIT COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD
AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 1 n.1
(2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf (defining for-
profits as "institutions of post-secondary education that are privately-owned or
owned by a publicly traded company and whose net earnings can benefit a
shareholder or individual"). For purposes of the False Claims Act, these
distinctions are irrelevant.
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institutions during the 2008-2009 academic .year, making up more
than forty percent of all institutions of higher education in
operation -fill an important niche in the education landscape. But at
alarmingly disproportionate rates compared. with their traditional
counterparts, for-profits have been implicated in stories of promises
that proved too good to be true. Take, for instance, the story of Traci
Joyce. A forty-year-old with fifteen years of experience in the
restaurant industry, Joyce enrolled in the for-profit California
Culinary Academy with aspirations to become an executive chef.3
With $130,000 worth of debt from the culinary program, however,
Joyce was unable to find little more than butchering and catering jobs
after graduation.4 She eventually returned to the pizzeria where she
worked before culinary school. Rather than resume her former
position as manager, though, she was demoted to working in the
restaurant's kitchen.6 Today, Joyce is one of thousands of plaintiffs in
a class-action lawsuit against the California Culinary Academy in
which the plaintiffs claim that the school "misrepresented its 98
percent job placement rate, exaggerated its prestige in the industry
and suggested that it had a selective qualifying process."' A $40
million settlement offer from the school is under court review as of
this writing.8
The allegations against the California Culinary Academy are
not anomalous. In 2010, an undercover Government Accountability
Office ("GAO") investigation revealed a damaging assessment of the
industry. Of fifteen for-profits investigated, nearly one-third had
encouraged fraudulent practices, such as the falsification of financial
aid forms to qualify for federal aid.9 Likewise, all fifteen institutions
had made deceptive or otherwise questionable statements-akin to
those in the case against the California Culinary Academy-about
such matters as accreditation and statistics regarding graduation,
2 DANIEL L. BENNETT ET AL., CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY &
PRODUCTIVITY, FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: GROWTH, INNOVATION AND
REGULATION 13 (2010), available at http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/
uploads/ForProfitHigherEd.pdf
3 Stacy Finz, For-Profit Colleges Face Lawsuits, US. Scrutiny, S.F. CHRON.,
May 1, 2011, at 2, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/
2011/05/01/MN4GlJ8PRR.DTL.
4id.
5id
6 id.
' Id. at 1.
8 Id.
9 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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employment, and expected salaries.' 0 In short, the report confirmed
that industry reform was in order.
Under the leadership of President Barack Obama, the
Department of Education has heeded the call for reform. Shortly after
the GAO issued its 2010 report, the Department released a
comprehensive set of regulations designed to strengthen federal
financial aid programs "by protecting students from aggressive or
misleading recruiting practices, providing consumers with better
information about the effectiveness of career college and training
programs, and ensuring that only eligible students or programs
receive aid."" The regulations are not limited in application to for-
profits, but the Department described the "rapid growth of
enrollment, debt load, and default rates at for-profit institutions in
recent years" as "prompt[ing]" the regulatory effort.' 2
Cognizant of these measures, this article advocates for the use
of another tool in the lar er undertaking of for-profit reform: the
False Claims Act ("FCA"). This federal statute imposes liability on
any person who makes a false or fraudulent claim for payment to the
federal government,14 and allows private individuals to sue civilly on
the government's behalf and share in the recovery.' 5 With respect to
for-profits, the FCA offers a potentially potent check on their
handling of federal financial aid. Indeed, an increasing number of
courts-in conflict with earlier courts-have been receptive to
individual-led actions that challenged for-profits' obtainment of
financial aid.16 These courts' interpretation of the statute, however,
has engendered critical response, leading some in the education
community to complain that educational institutions are now
susceptible to "high litigation expenses and possible damage awards
oId. at 9-13.
" Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Department of Education Establishes
New Student Aid Rules to Protect Borrowers and Taxpayers (Oct. 28, 2010),
available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-education-
establishes-new-student-aid-rules-protect-borrowers-and-tax.
12 Id.
13 This article focuses only on civil liability under the False Claims Act. For
discussion of proposals to criminalize, at the federal level, "diploma mills" and
"accreditation mills" that scheme to make a profit, see generally George Gollin et
al., Complexities in Legislative Suppression ofDiploma Mills, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 1 (2010).
14 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
's 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
16 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166
(9th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914
(7th Cir. 2005).
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for inadvertent errors on the numerous applications for federal aid
they must fill out annually."17
This article counters that such criticisms are overbroad in that
they fail to adequately consider both the FCA's overall statutory
structure and the sector of the education industry most vulnerable to a
more expansive statutory interpretation: the for-profit sector. Part I of
this article addresses the concerns about the industry and elaborates
on recent regulatory developments. Part II provides an overview of
the FCA and the extent to which it may be triggered by an
educational institution agreeing to , abide by various federal
regulations to receive financial aid. Additionally, Part II discusses the
split among the courts as to whether an institution that knowingly
contravenes one or more of these regulations may be liable for fraud
in an individual-led action. Part III espouses the FCA as an important
third-party enforcement tool to regulate fraud in the for-profit sector
and responds to the above-noted criticisms.
I. AN INDUSTRY RIPE FOR REFORM
Statistical data from the Department of Education paints a
peculiar picture of the for-profit education sector. The Department's
latest numbers show that although students at for-profits represent
only eleven percent of all higher-education students, they represent
twenty-six percent of all loan borrowers and forty-three percent of all
loan defaulters.18 More than a quarter of for-profits receive eighty
percent of their revenues from taxpayer-funded federal financial
aid. 19 This extensive reliance on federal funds has been integral to the
20for-profit sector's nearly six-fold enrollment growth since 1986.
Taken together, these figures have given consumers, taxpayers, and
regulators legitimate reasons to question whether some for-profits are
profiting on public money at the expense of students who are left
17 Rachel Perkins, Note, Federal Funding and Fraud: The False Claims Act in
Higher Education After Main v. Oakland City University, 35 J.C. & U.L. 747, 747
(2009) (footnote omitted).
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 11.
19 Id
20 BENNETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 10, 23 ("Federal student loan money is the
lifeblood of the for-profit education industry."); see also Nicholas R. Johnson,
Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary Institutions of Higher Education and
What Can Be Done to Reduce Them, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 225, 231-32 (2011). In
absolute numbers, enrollment grew from approximately 300,000 students in 1986
to nearly 1.8 million students in 2008. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 (citation
omitted).
4 [Vol. 24:1
2011] For-Profits Under Fire 5
with large debt loads in an emaciated job market and degrees of
questionable value. In harsher terms, the data suggests that some for-
profits may be committing fraud.
Ordinarily, market pressure would respond adversely to the
for-profit sector if it failed to live up to its promise to confer students
with degrees that can be leveraged to secure employment. As the
Government Accountability Office's recent investigation uncovered,
however, a general lack of transparency with respect to graduation,
employment, and loan-default statistics-in combination with
concerted advertising and marketing campaigns-thwarts many
student-consumers from exercising their purchasing power in an
informed way.21 Furthermore, the lender providing most of the funds
that keep for-profits afloat is the federal government; private third-
party lenders, such as banks and student lenders like Sallie Mae, have
largely refused to lend to for-profits, citing the high loan-default rates
and bad credit scores of the typically lower-income students at these
* 22institutions. The extent to which the government exerts analogous
market pressure thus turns on the regulatory system that it imposes on
for-profits and the degree to which the government enforces this
system.
Concerned about the interrelationship of enrollment growth,
debt loads, and default rates at for-profits, the Department of
Education has endeavored to rein in the excesses of the industry. The
"most crucial',23 tenet of the Department's reform is clarification of
an existing regulation that requires for-profits to prepare their
students for "gainful employment in a recognized occupation ....
To determine whether an institution meets this obligation, the
Department will assess whether the institution's graduates are paying
sufficient amounts on their student loan balances and whether they
are obtaining sufficient income to manage their debts.25 If an
21 See generally U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1
(describing how undercover applicants were provided unclear, misleading, or false
information by various for-profits).
22 See DEANNE LOONIN, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PILING IT ON: THE
GROWTH OF PROPRIETARY SCHOOL LOANS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR
STUDENTS 8-12 (2011), available at
http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/blogs/wp-content/www.studentloan
borrowerassistance.org/uploads/File/proprietary-schools-loans.pdf (noting that
private lenders ended their relationship with for-profit institutions following the
subprime private student loan market crash in 2008).
23 For-Profit Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/forprofit_schools/index.html?emc=eta2.
24 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(26) (2010).
25 See For Profit Schools, supra note 23.
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institution does not satisfy certain targets for student loan repayment
or ratios of debt to income, the institution will be foreclosed from
participating in the government's financial aid programs or will have
to disclose its shortcomings to students.26 Adopted "after the most
extensive public input in the Department's history," which included
the submission of more than 90,000 written comments, the new
regulations are scheduled to become effective on July 1, 2012.27
Meanwhile, other new Department regulations went into
effect in July of 2011. One such regulation targets the type of
misrepresentations and omissions that the 2010 GAO report
uncovered, and it further clarifies and expands upon for-profits'
28
obligations to disclose graduation and job-placement rates. Whereas
the predecessor regulation only required an institution to disclose job-
placement rates if the institution calculated them, the revised
regulation imposes an affirmative duty on an institution to disclose
such information to a prospective student for each program offered
and elucidates the steps an institution must take in putting such
information on the Web and in promotional materials. 29 Another
revised regulation overhauls a ban on incentive compensation to
admissions and financial aid personnel based on their enrollment of a
student in the institution or in a financial aid program 30-a rule that
has been the centerpiece of much False Claims Act litigation. In its
new form, the regulation eliminates twelve safe harbors that the
Department previously enacted, which "unscrupulous actors routinely
rel[ied] upon ... to circumvent the intent of the [statutory ban]."
The federal government's scrutiny of the for-profit sector has
not been without controversy. After the GAO revised its 2010 report,
26 See id.
27 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Announces New
Steps to Protect Students from Ineffective Career College Programs (June 2, 2011),
available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/gainful-employment-
regulations.
28 See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,838 (proposed Oct.
29, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668).
29 Compare 34 C.F.R. § 668.41(d)(5)(i) (2010) (requiring an institution to
disclose the job-placement rate for a program only "if it calculates such a rate" and
otherwise allowing an institution to satisfy its disclosure obligation by gathering
job-placement rates from "[s]tate data systems," "[a]lumni or student satisfaction
surveys," or "[o]ther relevant sources"), with Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed.
Reg. at 66,949 (requiring an institution to disclose the job-placement rate for a
program to a prospective student and publish this rate in promotional materials for
prosective students and on the institution's website).
See 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(i) (2010).
31 Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. at 66,872.
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the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions said that the revisions raised "serious
questions about the quality of rigor" of the investigation and
requested a detailed explanation of each change.32 Subsequently,
during the 112th Congress's contentious budget battle, a bipartisan
group of House legislators sought to prevent funding to the
Department of Education to implement the new regulations. 33
Although this measure proved unsuccessful, 34 the for-profit sector
has pressed onward in its fight against the regulations, increasing its
lobbying efforts and even filing a lawsuit that challenges several of
the regulations as unconstitutional and beyond the scope of the
enabling statute. 35 These developments suggest that politics may
restrain the government's ability to bring pressure to bear on the for-
profit sector.3 6 A third-party enforcement mechanism accordingly is
necessary to police those institutions in the industry that draw
substantial funds from taxpayers yet encumber their students with
debt and useless educational credentials. One such mechanism-the
False Claims Act-provides the legal framework to fill enforcement
gaps left by the government.
32 Tamar Lewin, U.S. Revises Report dn Commercial Colleges, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/education/09gao.html?ref=for
profitschools. The revised report "soften[ed] some of the [original report's]
findings but without changing its conclusion that the colleges visited had engaged
in deception or fraud." Id. The revisions included clarification that a college
representative told an undercover applicant that she "could"-rather than
"should"--take out the maximum amount of federal loans, regardless of her need
for all the money, and that the applicant "could"-rather than "should"--put the
extra money in a high-interest savings account. Id.
33 See Chris Kirkham, House Quashes Rules on Student Debt at For-Profit
Colleges, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2011/02/18/for-profit-college-regulations n_825322.html.
34 See Chris Kirkham, Budget Deal Allows Regulations to Move Forward on
For-Profit Colleges, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/09/budget-deal-for-profit-colleges_n
847047.html.
3 See Career Coll. Ass'n v. Duncan, No. 11-0138 (RMC), 2011WL 2690406
(D.D.C. July 12, 2011); see also Goldie Blumenstyk, With Lawsuit, For-Profit
Colleges Step Up Fight Against New Regulations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 31,
2011), http://chronicle.com/article/With-Lawsuit-For-Profit/126042/.
36 Cf, e.g., Lewin, supra note 32 (noting the "highly partisan atmosphere"
surrounding Senate committee oversight hearings regarding the for-profit sector
and the Department of Education's regulatory efforts).
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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Created in response to military contractor fraud during the
Civil War, the False Claims Act serves as the federal government's
primary enforcement tool against government-targeted fraud. The
central pillar of the FCA is a provision that permits private
individuals to act as "private attorneys general" 37 and bring fraud
suits on the government's behalf. Traditionally, government
contractors and health care providers that participate in federal health
insurance schemes have been the subjects of these suits. More
recently, though, educational institutions-particularly for-profits-
that participate in federal financial aid programs have faced FCA
litigation. The legal framework that has resulted is one in which
federal district and circuit courts have reached conflicting decisions,
which have yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
a. The False Claims Act and Its Qui Tam Provision
The FCA imposes liability for seven types of fraud.38 One
may incur liability, for example, if one "knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval" or if one "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to .a false or fraudulent
claim." 39 In this context, "knowledge" refers to one's actual
knowledge of information, deliberate ignorance with respect to the
truth or falsity of information, or reckless disregard with respect to
the truth or falsity of information.40 Notably, the statutory definition
expressly excludes specific intent to defraud. 41 "Claim" under the
FCA "means any request or demand, whether under a contract or
otherwise, for money or property," regardless of whether the money
or property is titled to the federal government.42 "Material" "means
having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing,
the payment or receipt of money or property."43 If a defendant is
ultimately deemed to have met these elements of liability, that person
must pay the government a civil penalty between $5,000 and
37 United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371,
376 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
3831 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
39 Id. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B).
40 Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A).
41 See id. § 3729(b)(1)(B).
42 Id. § 3729(b)(2)(A).
43 Id. § 3729(b)(4).
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$10,000, plus treble damages and court costs.46
The "most significant aspect'A5 of the FCA is its qui tam46
provision. This provision incentivizes private individuals, called
"relators,"47 to serve the government as watchdogs against fraud,
allowing them to share up to thirty percent of the recovery against a
defendant.48 For a court to have jurisdiction over a qui tam suit, a
relator must be an "original source" of the information underlying the
basis of the suit.49 An original source is a person who, (1) prior to the
disclosure of information in a public or media forum, voluntarily
furnished to the government "information on which allegations or
transactions in a claim are based," or (2) "has knowledge that is
independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action . . . ."so Upon
receipt of such information, the government must investigate the
relator's allegations while the relator's complaint is under seal.
Thereafter, the government generally may choose to intervene in the
action, decline to intervene and allow the relator to proceed, or move
to dismiss the action.52 Whatever course it chooses, the government
will have a visible role to play in the ensuing proceeding.
b. The False Claims Act as Applied to Educational Institutions
The FCA recognizes various theories of liability for fraud. At
its most fundamental level, the FCA recognizes liability on a
mischarge or overcharge theory; that is, a person may be liable for
4 Id. § 3729(a).
45 Roberto M. Braceras & Karin Bell, The False Claims Act and Universities:
From Fraud to Compliance, C. & U.L. MANUAL § 8.2.4 (2009).
46 "Qui tam" is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur. This phrase translates into "who as well for the king as
for himself sues in this matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). The qui
tam action developed at English common law, which granted access to the courts to
citizens who alleged that both the King's interest and their own interest had been
harmed. Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.2.4.
47 See Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.2.1.
48 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (d) (2006).
49 Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
so Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
51 Id § 3730(a)-(b).
52 See id. § 3730(b).
53 See, e.g., id. § 3730(c)(3) (allowing the government to receive all pleadings
and deposition transcripts in a qui tam action even if it does not intervene).
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mischarging or overcharging the government for a good or service.54
Other, more attenuated, theories are also cognizable under the FCA.
For example, liability may attach under a false certification theory,
which posits that a claim "can be false where a party merely falsely
certifies compliance with a statute or regulation as a condition to
government payment."55 Similarly, liability may attach in the absence
of an explicitly false claim under a promissory fraud or fraud-in-the-
inducement theory. 56 This theory "holds that liability may attach to
each claim submitted to the government under a contract, when the
contract or extension of government benefit was originally obtained
through false statements or fraudulent conduct."57
In the educational setting, the false certification and
promissory fraud theories may have major implications given the
nature of the procedure that an institution must follow to receive
federal financial aid. To participate in the various financial aid
programs enumerated under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of
1965 58-the Federal Pell Grant and Federal Perkins Loan Programs,
among others-educational institutions, including for-profits, must
sign a program participation agreement ("PPA") with the Secretary of
Education. 9 This agreement "conditions the initial and continued
participation of an eligible institution" in a funding program on its
compliance with various regulatory requirements-for example, the
above-mentioned incentive-compensation ban.6 0  Once the
Department of Education determines that an institution is qualified to
participate, a student then must request Title IV funding via a Free
Application for Federal Student Aid ("FAFSA"). Upon the
student's approval, the government pays the student's institution.
The foregoing process thus creates a situation where an
educational institution is essentially one step removed from the
release of federal money. The question that has divided the courts is
54 Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.2.5(a).
55 United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2006).
56 Id. at 1173.
5 Id. The false certification and promissory fraud theories are "not so
different" from each other, premising FCA liability on a finding of the same
essential elements: "(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) made
with scienter, (3) that was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money
or forfeit moneys due." Id. at 1174.
58 Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
5 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(a)(1) (2010).
6 0 Id § 668.14(a)(1), (b)(22).
61 See 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006).
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whether an institution that knowingly breaches its PPA-a document
that, unlike a FAFSA, does not directly elicit payment by the
government-can be liable for fraud under the False Claims Act. The
FCA's qui tam provision presents another layer in the analysis, as
relators have been the primary parties to seek recovery against
educational institutions.
c. The Developing-and Conflicting-Case Law
In the early 2000s, two Texas district courts were faced with
the then-novel question of whether, under a false certification theory,
for-profit educational institutions that participated in Title IV
financial aid programs were liable under the FCA for knowingly
violating their regulatory obligations in their PPAs. 62 In both cases,
United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educational Services, Inc.63 and
United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Institute, Inc.,64 the
facts were similar: The relators, who were admissions personnel at
for-profits, alleged that the defendant-institutions engaged in fraud
by paying admissions personnel on a commission basis. According to
the relators, this conduct was contrary to the incentive-compensation
ban that the institutions had stipulated to in their PPAs.6 5
The courts responded skeptically to the relators' arguments.
For both courts, the fact that the FAFSA forms-which the relators
did not allege "were false or contained false statements" 66-directly
triggered the government's payment to the defendants, rather than
their PPAs, compelled dismissal of the relators' claims. 67 As the
Graves court explained, certification of compliance with the
regulatory requirements codified in the PPA was "not an express
condition of payment of specific claims or retention of payments,"
but rather was a "general statement of adherence to all regulations or
statutes governing participation in a program through which federal
funds are received . . . ."68 Accordingly, the relators alleged an
62 See United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., No. Civ.A.
301CV505K, 2003 WL 22474586 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2003), aff'd per curiam, F.
App'x 286 (5th Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc.,
284 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D. Tex. 2003), aff'dper curiam, 111 F. App'x 296 (5th Cir.
2004).
63 Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
' Gay, 2003 WL 22474586 at *1.
65 Id. at *1; Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
66 Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
67 See Gay, 2003 WL 22474586 at *4; Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
68 Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (emphasis added).
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insufficient basis of liability for fraud under the FCA, and the courts
thus granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.69 In unpublished opinions,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both cases.70
Shortly after the Graves and Gay courts rendered their
decisions, other federal appellate courts reached opposite conclusions
in cases involving virtually the same facts. In United States ex rel.
Main v. Oakland City University,7 1 the Seventh Circuit expressly
rejected the lower court's ruling that "even wilful [sic] falsehoods in
[a PPA] do not violate the Act, because the [PPA] requests a
declaration of eligibility rather than an immediate payment from the
Treasury." 72 The FCA, the Seventh Circuit stated, simply "requires a
causal rather than a temporal connection between fraud and
payment."7 3 Ultimately, the court held that the relator alleged a
sufficient cause of action in contending that the defendant-nonprofit
university had used a falsified PPA to make, or cause a student to
make or use, a FAFSA that was "itself false because it represent[ed]
that the student [wa]s enrolled in an eligible institution, which
[wa]sn't true." 74 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh
Circuit's approach in United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of
Phoenix.75 Finding that the relators alleged actionable fraud under
either a false certification or promissory fraud theory of liability, the
court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that emphasis on certification
of regulatory compliance as an express condition of payment of
financial aid was misplaced: "[I]t is irrelevant how the federal
bureaucracy has apportioned the statements among layers of
paperwork." 76
Other courts have followed Main and Hendow. Recently, two
69 See Gay, 2003 WL 22474586 at *4-5; Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 502, 510.
7o See United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 111 F. App'x 296
(5th Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Gay v. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., 111 F.
App'x 286 (5th Cir. 2004).
71 United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.
2005).
72 Id. at 916 (emphasis added).
73 id.
74 id.
7 United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th
Cir. 2006). Prior to Hendow, a district court in the Ninth Circuit relied on Main to
reject a nonprofit university's motion to dismiss a relator's claim that the university
knowingly violated an accreditation requirement in its PPA. See United States v.
Chapman Univ., No. SACV 04-1256JVSRCX, 2006 WL 1562231 (C.D. Cal. May
23, 2006).
76 Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Main, 426 F.3d at 916).
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district courts in the Eleventh Circuit relied on these decisions in
cases in which the relators, who worked in various positions at for-
profits, alleged that the defendant-institutions knowingly breached
the regulatory obligations in their PPAs.77 These alleged breaches
involved not just the incentive-compensation ban, but also a
requirement that an institution make employment statistics available
to prospective students if the institution advertises job placement
rates. In United States ex rel. Powell v. American Intercontinental
University, Inc., 79 for example, the court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for an interlocutory appeal
to resolve the apparent circuit split.80 In denying the latter motion, the
court surveyed the receptive judicial treatment that the Main-Hendow
line of decision received in contrast to the Graves-Gay line of
decision, which the court found amounted to "two district court
opinions of limited precedential and persuasive value."8' These
opinions, in the court's view, were not enough to create a
"substantial difference of opinion as to whether courts should
distinguish between conditions of eligibility for government funding
and conditions of payment for purposes of an FCA claim."82 As the
court's opinion indicates, Main and Hendow appear to represent the
predominant analytical approach.83
III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AS A REGULATORY CHECK ON
THE FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION SECTOR
The courts -that adopted the Main-Hendow framework wisely
interpreted the False Claims Act, which is broadly "intended to reach
all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial
" See United States ex rel. Gatsiopoulos v. Kaplan Career Instit., No. 09-
21720-CIV, 2010 WL 5392668 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2010); United States ex rel.
Powell v. Am. Intercontinental Univ., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-2277-RWS, 2010 WL
2245574 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 2010); see also Tamar Lewin, Scrutiny Takes Toll on
For-Profit College Company, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/education/1Okaplan.html?emc=etal
(discussing the Gatsiopoulos litigation).
See Gatsiopoulos, 2010 WL 5392668 at *5.
7 United States ex rel. Powell v. Am. Intercontinental Univ., Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
8 1 Id. at 1381.
" Id. at 1380.
82 Id.
83 But cf Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.5.2 (citing cases outside the
educational setting in which "courts have opted not to adopt the reasoning of
Oakland City University and its progeny").
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loss to the Government."84 This framework appreciates that the
program participation agreements that for-profit and other
educational institutions sign with the federal government are
designed to protect consumers and safeguard against the abuse of
taxpayer dollars. If, however, the overly formalistic Graves-Gay
framework prevailed, for-profits would be at much greater liberty to
disregard the obligations in their PPAs. Institutions would have
little incentive to police themselves, and compliance thus would turn
largely on external government enforcement, which, as noted, may be
difficult to predict depending on the political climate. In contrast, the
jurisprudence of Main and Hendow, along with the qui tam provision
of the FCA, gives for-profits reason to internally regulate their
behavior to ensure compliance with their PPAs. Exemplifying this
reasoning, one article encourages colleges and universities to enact
institution-wide compliance programs, reporting protocols,
centralized management systems for government-funded projects,
and training programs to avoid exposure to fraud under Main and
Hendow.86
Nevertheless, despite the "axiomatic fit"87 between the FCA
and the relators' allegations in the cases, the education communit
has responded critically to Main and Hendow and their progeny.
84 United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (footnote
omitted).
85 See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1176
(9th Cir. 2006) ("In the context of Title IV and the Higher Education Act, if we
held that conditions of participation were not conditions of payment, there would
be no conditions of payment at all-and thus, an educational institution could flout
the law at will.").
86 See Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.6.
87 Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1168.
88 See, e.g., Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.4 (describing Main and
Hendow as holding that, "if a government payment would not have been made 'but
for' a university's false statement of compliance with a particular rule or regulation,
then the university can be held liable-no matter how attenuated the relationship
between the false statement and the subsequent claim for payment"); Tresa Baldas,
Universities Targeted by False Claim Act Suits, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10, 2007, at 6
(quoting an education attorney as describing Main as "a very dangerous and
extreme expansion of the FCA [that] will impact not only colleges, but anyone who
does business with the government"); Doug Lederman, Inviting a Flurry of False
Claims Cases, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 24, 2005),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/10/24/false#Comments (quoting
attorneys critical of Main); Mark L. Pelesh, Tripping Up on the Paperwork, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (Nov. 4, 2005),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2005/11/04/pelesh (describing Main as an
instance of "how even an eminent jurist[, Judge Easterbrook,] can be confused by
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The foremost concern, as the university expressed in Main, is that the
causality test articulated by the court in that case "would treat any
violation of federal regulations in a funding program as actionable
fraud ... .. "89 This concern is amplified by the traits that make
educational institutions "an attractive target" for qui tam actions:
They tend to be large and decentralized; they have a "broad pool of
potential whistle-blowers," ranging from students and professors to
administrative staff; and they "are believed to have deep
pockets . . . ."90
Though the education community understandably may be
more risk averse after Main and Hendow, its criticism is overblown.
Importantly, the criticism overlooks the difference between a breach
of contract and fraud. Although an institution could breach its PPA
by accidentally violating one of the regulations therein, fraud would
require an institution to breach its agreement with knowledge that it
was violating the regulation. As the Seventh Circuit observed:
"[F]raud entails making a false representation, such as a statement
that the speaker will do something it plans not to do. Tripping up on a
regulatory complexity does not entail a knowingly false
representation."9 One writer points out, moreover, that "[c]ritics of
the recent change in the law are unable to point to any case where a
college or university inadvertently, or even negligently, violated a
Title IV regulation and were successfully sued under the False
Claims Act.'2
The education community presumably grasps the critical
knowledge component that separates breach of contract from fraud.
Most likely, its apprehension arises not from the repercussions of
"tripping up on the paperwork," 93 but from the prospect that under
principles of vicarious liability a low- or mid-level institutional
employee's knowledge of a false claim may be imputed to the
institution. 94 Some critics describe vicarious liability as "present[ing]
a particular challenge, given the sheer number of employees and the
the complex regulatory system established by the Higher Education Act, with
potentially significant negative consequences for colleges and universities").
89 United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 917 (7th
Cir. 2005).
90 Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.1.
9' Main, 426 F.3d at 917.
92 Perkins, supra note 17, at 769.
93 Pelesh, supra note 88.
94 See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. United States, 696 F.2d 888, 891 (11th Cir.
1983). Generally, an employee must be acting within the scope of his or her
employment for the employee's knowledge to be imputed to the employer. See id.
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decentralized aspect of most universities."9 5 In their words:
Oversight is especially difficult for universities, where
government-funded projects are often supervised and
controlled by separate individual professors receiving
federal grant money. Each professor, graduate student, and
research assistant receiving some federal assistance is a
potential source for an FCA claim. Add to this environment
the great number of complex rules and regulations with
which compliance must be "certified" before government
funds are released-and certified by professors or other
researchers who have little experience in government
administration and contracting-and the task of avoiding
exposure to the FCA seems almost insurmountable. 96
Whatever the merits of these concerns, they are not
necessarily applicable to for-profits, which have significant
operational differences from public and private nonprofit colleges
and universities. Unlike the latter institutions, for-profits usually are
not decentralized, employing standardized curricula and other
efficiency-enhancing techniques.9 7 They are also relatively small and
enroll only about 600 students on average, while public and private
nonprofit institutions enroll 7000 and 2000 students on average,
respectively.9 For-profits, furthermore, spend virtually nothing on
research and public service; by contrast, public and private nonprofit
institutions spend 14 percent and 12.5 percent, respectively, in these
areas.99 In sum, for-profits generally will have a much less
convincing argument than their traditional counterparts that they
should not be responsible for a rogue employee's actions.
The FCA's knowledge requirement is only one of the features
built into the statute that guards against limitless liability. The qui
tam nature of the challenges to for-profits' activities is also an
important consideration. As noted, a relator in such an action must be
an "original source," the jurisdictional criteria for which a party can
neither waive nor concede. 00 Courts already have dismissed qui tam
actions against for-profits where the relator did not meet these
9s Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.4.
96 Id.
See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 28.
98 Id. at 15.
9 Id. at 25.
1oo See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 467-70 (2007).
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criteria.' 0' Conceivably, as the for-profit sector endures greater public
attention as a result of the Department of Education's reforms, courts
will analyze with extra scrutiny whether relators in qui tam actions
against for-profits are an original source of the information
underlying their allegations.
Similarly, the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) acts as a statutory restraint. 102 The Third Circuit
explained that "Rule 9(b) requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs
support their allegations ... with all of the essential factual
background that would accompany 'the first paragraph of any
newspaper story'-that is, the 'who, what, when, where and how' of
the events at issue."' 03 As in suits that did not survive challenges to
the relators being an original source, several courts dismissed qui tam
actions against for-profits where the relators did not meet Rule 9(b)'s
exacting standard." 4 In United States ex rel. Gatsiopoulos v. Kaplan
Career Institute,05 for example, the court held that although the
relators sufficiently alleged that the defendant for-profit violated the
incentive-compensation ban in its PPA, they failed to sufficiently
allege that the institution violated various statutory and regulatory
requirements regarding job placement rates, licensing requirements,
graduation rates, and an "ability to benefit" test. 0 6
Beyond the statutory restrictions, the critics in the education
community also overstate the breadth of potential liability under
Main and Hendow. A large segment of the education industry has
little reason to worry: As a matter of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity, state colleges and universities are not subject to qui tam
'01 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lopez v. Strayer Educ., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 2d
633 (E.D. Va. 2010); Schultz v. Devry Inc., No. 07 C 5425, 2009 WL 562286
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2009).
102 See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.").
103 In re: Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir.
2002) (citation omitted).
104 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bott v. Silicon Valley Colls., 262 F. App'x
810 (9th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Jajdelski v. Kaplan, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-
01054-KJD-GWF, 2011 WL 2669485 (D. Nev. July 7, 2011); United States ex rel.
Gatsiopoulos v. Kaplan Career Instit., No. 09-21720-CIV, 2010 WL 5392668 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 22, 2010); United States ex rel. Pilecki-Simko v. Chubb Instit., No. 06-
3562, 2010 WL 1076228 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2010); United States ex rel. Leveski v.
ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-867-WTL-JMS, 2009 WL 3079526 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 23, 2009).
105 Gatsiopoulos, 2010 WL 5392668 at *1.
106 See id. at *4-7.
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liability.'o 7 Although the question of community colleges' liability is
unresolved, at least one federal court held that even community
colleges are due sovereign immunity from qui tam liability where the
college is an agency of the state rather than of the locality.Ios Private
nonprofit institutions are not entitled to such immunity, but market
incentives may mitigate their proclivity to engage in tactics that
exposed other institutions to liability. Institutional rankings, for
instance, usuall' treat stricter admissions policies more favorably
than lax ones;' therefore, an institution puts its ranking and thus
credibility at risk by admitting under- or unqualified students and
financially rewarding its admission or financial aid personnel
accordingly. For-profits, however-the subset of institutions most
likely to absorb the impact of a more liberal regime under the FCA-
cater to the very students that public and private nonprofit institutions
often determine are unqualified to attend their institutions, 0 and for-
profits are also generally removed from pressures such as
institutional rankings. For-profits consequently may be more apt to
admit more students and, as the case law substantiates, violate the
incentive-compensation ban in their PPAs. "
107 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 787-88 (2000) (holding that a "private individual has standing to bring suit in
federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3733, but that the False Claims Act does not subject a State (or state
agency) to liability in such actions").
1os See United States ex rel. Diop v. Wayne Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 242 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 526-28 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also Perkins, supra note 17, at 750-
51.
109 See, e.g., Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, Law School Rankings
Methodology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/2011/03/14/law-
school-rankings-methodology-2012 (noting that a law school's acceptance rate will
affect its selectivity assessment for ranking purposes).
110 See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 31 ("For -many traditional public and
private nonprofit colleges the percentage of students turned away is viewed as a
source of prestige. The same cannot be said about for-profits, as they generally
have less stringent admissions requirements . . . . In a sense, for-profits are willing
to give a chance to many students that would likely be turned away from a
traditional college or univeisity.").
"' These statements, of course, are generalizations, which assume, for
example, that an institution subject to a ranking system will accurately report its
admission numbers. Suffice to say, the kind of "soft" factors, such as reputation,
that many nonprofit institutions strive to protect from tarnishing do not weigh
nearly as heavily for for-profits. In fact, internal training documents from several
for-profits which were recently released to Congress question whether, in the race
for profit, some institutions have any recognition for institutional standards at all. A
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A final backstop is the federal government itself: "While the
qui tam relator is empowered as a private prosecutor, it is not
empowered to replace the government."' 12 Though it may choose not
to intervene in a qui tam action, the government maintains substantial
oversight authority. The government may dismiss an action, for
example, "if the court and the Attorney General give written consent
to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting."' 3 In the for-profit
educational context, these checks and balances mean that the
government is unlikely to authorize baseless lawsuits. As the
Department of Education tightens the rules governing gainful
employment, incentive compensation, misleading advertising, and
use of public funds, it is plausible that the government may deem qui
tam actions against for-profits as interference with its enforcement
policy and intervene as it sees fit. On the other hand, the government
may perceive such litigation as an extra means to fight fraud in the
industry and may be more amenable to it. The latter may be the
government's currently preferred approach, in light of its recent
decision to join-for the first time ever-a qui tam action against a
for-profit educational company, Education Management Corporation,
in which the company is accused of committing fraud by knowingy
violating the incentive-compensation ban in the company's PPA.
Irrespective of the course the government takes in this or any other
given case, however, the foregoing considerations, when weighed
document from one institution described its target market for recruiters as follows:
"We serve the UN-DER world, Unemployed, Underpaid, Unsatisfied, Unskilled,
Unprepared, Unsupported, Unmotivated, Unhappy, Underserved!" Chris Kirkham,
For-Profit College Recruiters Taught to Use 'Pain,' 'Fear,' Internal Documents
Show, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011
/02/08/for-profit-college-recruiters-documents_n_820337.html.
112 United States ex rel. Dep't of Def. v. Caci Int'l Inc., 953 F. Supp. 74, 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted).
" 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).
114 Tamar Lewin, Questions Follow Leader of For-Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES
(May 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/education/27edmc.html?page
wanted= 1 &emc=etal [hereinafter Lewin, Questions Follow] ("Some for-profit
executives are puzzled that the Justice Department is intervening in the case at a
time when the 'safe harbor' in the law is about to be closed: under Education
Department regulations that take effect in July, recruiters can no longer be
compensated for each student they enroll, even if their enrollment numbers are not
the sole basis for the pay."); see also Tamar Lewin, U.S. to Join Suit Against For-
Profit College Chain, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/education/03edmc.html?ref=forprofitschools.
The litigation against Education Management Corporation is further distinctive in
that at least two States, including Illinois, also have intervened, alleging violations
of their state counterparts to the False Claims Act. Lewin, Questions Follow, supra.
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together, make apparent that allegations that Main and Hendow
"signal a significant expansion of FCA liability for universities"' 1 5
are exaggerated.
CONCLUSION
The fuel that has propelled the for-profit education sector's
growth-funds largely from federal student loans-has proved for all
too many students to be a double-edged sword as they struggle to pay
the debt for an education that they thought would yield economic
improvement in their lives. Although there undoubtedly are law-
abiding for-profit institutions that provide valuable educational
services, 116 fraud-as it is understood within the confines of the False
Claims Act-is well demonstrated in the industry. Concerned that the
industry has gone unchecked for too long, the Department of
Education has embarked on an ambitious effort toward reform.
Whether this effort will be successful, however, remains to be seen.
In the meantime, the FCA offers an important enforcement
mechanism that private individuals, by way of the FCA's qui tam
provision, can use to ensure that for-profits follow the rules to which
they bind themselves to receive government money. A number of
courts, including the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, have been
instrumental in strengthening this statute as an enforcement tool,
concluding that as long as "a false statement is integral to a causal
chain leading to payment, it is irrelevant how the federal bureaucracy
has apportioned the statements among layers of paperwork."' 1 7 The
criticism of these courts' decisions has been sharp, but it misses the
mark by failing to account for the various features of the FCA that
detect and deter meritless lawsuits. Additionally, the criticism
neglects that these decisions will most likely affect the for-profit
sector of the education industry-the sector, as experience has
shown, in which fraud is particularly acute.
In sum, an institution that has knowingly violated the
provisions of its agreement with the federal government to receive
financial aid should be held accountable for its actions. Even if, as
115 Braceras & Bell, supra note 45, § 8.5.2.
116 See, e.g., Amanda Harmon Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills
to For-Profit Colleges and Universities: Business Opportunities, Regulatory
Challenges, and Consumer Responsibility in Higher Education, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 505, 515 (2009) (providing examples of "companies ... that strive
to both educate students for better careers and make a profit").
117 United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th
Cir. 2005).
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one for-profit argued, these requirements are "nothing more than ...
hundreds of boilerplate requirements with which [the institution]
promises compliance.. . . fraud is fraud, regardless of how 'small."'
Given the government's recommitment to the rules that an institution
must follow to obtain financial aid, the for-profit sector must
collectively internalize this message- and must do so now more than
ever.
118 United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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